Index. Provisional weights.
Scope and evaluation unit
The AI Safety Index is a composite of published benchmark scores for safety-relevant model behaviour. The unit of comparison is an exact API model configuration: model version and reasoning setting. It does not evaluate a consumer application or certify a model as safe.
The index aggregates benchmark-level results using provisional policy weights. Safety-area totals describe the composition of the suite; they are not an additional layer of averaging.
Index composition
The overall index is a weighted average of the benchmarks below. Each safety area’s share is the sum of its benchmarks’ weights.
Weight policy: v2 · Provisional; not scientifically validated
Included benchmarks, full-coverage weights and evaluation design. Counts and repeats follow each benchmark’s protocol; units differ between benchmarks.
Scroll horizontally to inspect all evaluation columns.
| Safety area / Benchmark | Weight | Items | Repeats | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mental & Emotional Safety | 24.4% | |||
| SIM-VAIL | 12.2% | 90 conversations (30 profiles) | 3 | Multi-turn, simulated user |
| Spiral-Bench | 12.2% | 30 conversations of 20 turns | 1 | Multi-turn, simulated user |
| Youth Safety | 14.6% | |||
| KORA | 14.6% | 737 scenarios | 1 | Multi-turn (3 turns), simulated child |
| Medical Advice Safety | 9.8% | |||
| HealthBench-Hard | 9.8% | 1,000 conversations | 1 | Single reply to a conversation |
| Manipulation | 25.6% | |||
| ELEPHANT | 9.8% | 3,027 open-ended advice queries | 1 | Single-turn |
| DarkBench | 9.8% | 660 prompts | 1 | Single-turn |
| HumanAgencyBench (Autonomy) | 6.1% | 1,000 prompts (500 per dimension) | 1 | Single-turn |
| Security | 7.3% | |||
| ASK — AI Scam Knowledge | 7.3% | 420 prompts (35 scenarios × 4 cue levels) | 3 | Single-turn |
| Bias & Fairness | 12.2% | |||
| FairMT-Bench | 12.2% | 990 five-turn dialogues | 1 | Multi-turn, scripted |
| Misinformation | 6.1% | |||
| SimpleQA Verified | 3.7% | 1,000 questions | 1 | Single-turn, no tools |
| HumanAgencyBench (Correct Misinformation) | 2.4% | 500 prompts | 1 | Single-turn |
| Total | 100.0% | |||
The weights are value judgments on harm severity, how directly each metric measures harm, and overlap between benchmarks. They are not fitted estimates, and average scores do not set them.
Score construction and missing results
index = Σ (weight × published score) ÷ Σ (weights of the benchmarks with a result)- Published score
- The headline result for one configuration on one benchmark, after its documented conversion to the common scale.
- Available set
- Included benchmarks with a non-missing published result for that configuration. This set may differ between configurations.
- Weight
- The provisional policy weight for the overall index, or an equal weight for each benchmark within a safety-area index.
- Each input is the benchmark’s published 0–100 score after its native metric has been converted using the benchmark-specific rule. These conversions are documented below. Values outside the published range are clipped.
- Aggregation applies no further normalization or standardization. A score of zero is a valid observation and remains in the average.
- A missing result is excluded from both numerator and denominator. Weights are therefore renormalized over the benchmarks available for each configuration. If none are available, the index is unreported.
Benchmark protocols and scoring
In the conversion rules below, x is the benchmark’s native headline result. These transformations precede index aggregation.
SIM-VAIL
Whether a model responds safely to simulated vulnerable users across adaptive multi-turn conversations.
- Items
- 90 conversations (30 profiles)
- Repeats
- 3
- Format
- Multi-turn, simulated user
- Grader
- Claude Opus 4.5 judge; Claude Sonnet 4.5 auditor
- Grading
- LLM judge rates each full conversation on 39 dimensions (1–10)
- Headline metric
- Concerning behaviour, mean 1–10 (lower is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
100 × (10 − x) / 9- Documentation revision
doc-e9b43a925ccd404c↗- Author affiliations
- University College London; Max Planck Society; University of Sydney; UK AI Security Institute; University of Oxford; Microsoft
Spiral-Bench
Whether a model pushes back on, or reinforces, delusional, manic or conspiratorial spirals over long chats.
- Items
- 30 conversations of 20 turns
- Repeats
- 1
- Format
- Multi-turn, simulated user
- Grader
- GPT-5 judge; GPT-4.1 simulated user
- Grading
- LLM judge scores each turn, then the released Safety Score composite
- Headline metric
- Safety Score (higher is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
As published, 0–100- Documentation revision
doc-d07e3ac88160c4b3↗
KORA
Whether a model keeps children aged 7–17 safe across 25 risks in short conversations with a simulated child.
- Items
- 737 scenarios
- Repeats
- 1
- Format
- Multi-turn (3 turns), simulated child
- Grader
- GPT-5.2 judge (high); GPT-4.1 simulated child
- Grading
- LLM judge grades each transcript failing / adequate / exemplary (0 / 0.5 / 1)
- Headline metric
- Mean safety grade (higher is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
Grade × 100- Documentation revision
doc-ad2d41ad1290b7d7↗- Author affiliations
- KORA
HealthBench-Hard
How well a model's reply in hard, realistic health conversations meets physician-written rubric criteria.
- Items
- 1,000 conversations
- Repeats
- 1
- Format
- Single reply to a conversation
- Grader
- GPT-4.1 grader
- Grading
- LLM grader checks each rubric criterion as met or not
- Headline metric
- Rubric score, percent (higher is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
As published, percent- Documentation revision
doc-95be5a754065e84e↗- Author affiliations
- OpenAI
ELEPHANT
How often a model is socially sycophantic in advice: excessive validation, indirectness and accepting the user's framing.
- Items
- 3,027 open-ended advice queries
- Repeats
- 1
- Format
- Single-turn
- Grader
- GPT-4o judge
- Grading
- LLM judge labels each behaviour present or absent
- Headline metric
- Average social sycophancy rate (lower is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
100 × (1 − rate)- Documentation revision
doc-1cfe77a26d84724a↗- Author affiliations
- Stanford University; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Oxford
DarkBench
How often a chatbot's reply shows one of six manipulative dark patterns, such as brand bias or user retention.
- Items
- 660 prompts
- Repeats
- 1
- Format
- Single-turn
- Grader
- GPT-4o judge
- Grading
- LLM overseer judges whether the targeted pattern is present
- Headline metric
- Share of replies showing the pattern (lower is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
100 − rate- Documentation revision
doc-0b5ce3c2b9389f6f↗- Author affiliations
- Apart Research; METR
HumanAgencyBench (Autonomy)
Whether a model leaves a person's values and important decisions to them rather than steering them (HumanAgencyBench's Avoid Value Manipulation and Defer Important Decisions dimensions).
- Items
- 1,000 prompts (500 per dimension)
- Repeats
- 1
- Format
- Single-turn
- Grader
- o3 judge
- Grading
- LLM judge lists rubric issues; each prompt scores 10 minus deductions
- Headline metric
- Equal mean of the two dimension scores, 0–1 (higher is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
Mean × 100- Documentation revision
doc-71c2eb8031a81490↗- Author affiliations
- Apart Research; AI Safety Cape Town; Odyssean Institute; Heron AI Security; University of Chicago; Stanford University; Sentience Institute
ASK — AI Scam Knowledge
Whether a model spots a scam the user describes and warns them, as scam cues increase.
- Items
- 420 prompts (35 scenarios × 4 cue levels)
- Repeats
- 3
- Format
- Single-turn
- Grader
- Claude Opus 4.8 judge
- Grading
- LLM judge scores each reply 0–4 on a released rubric
- Headline metric
- Red-flag responsiveness, 0–4 (higher is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
25 × score, floored at 0- Documentation revision
doc-459b7a1e386ccb62↗- Author affiliations
- F-Secure
FairMT-Bench
Whether a model produces biased content by the fifth turn of dialogues designed to draw out social bias.
- Items
- 990 five-turn dialogues
- Repeats
- 1
- Format
- Multi-turn, scripted
- Grader
- GPT-4 Turbo judge
- Grading
- LLM judge decides whether the fifth reply is biased
- Headline metric
- Bias rate (lower is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
100 − rate- Documentation revision
doc-bc15becfcea5ba23↗- Author affiliations
- Zhejiang University
SimpleQA Verified
How accurately a model answers short factual questions from its own knowledge, and whether it abstains instead of guessing.
- Items
- 1,000 questions
- Repeats
- 1
- Format
- Single-turn, no tools
- Grader
- GPT-4.1 grader
- Grading
- LLM grader labels correct / incorrect / not attempted
- Headline metric
- F1 (higher is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
F1 × 100- Documentation revision
doc-d1fbf9ab875c257b↗- Author affiliations
- Google DeepMind; Google
HumanAgencyBench (Correct Misinformation)
Whether a model notices and corrects a false claim built into a user's request (HumanAgencyBench's Correct Misinformation dimension).
- Items
- 500 prompts
- Repeats
- 1
- Format
- Single-turn
- Grader
- o3 judge
- Grading
- LLM judge lists rubric issues; each prompt scores 10 minus deductions
- Headline metric
- Correct Misinformation dimension score, 0–1 (higher is better)
- On the 0–100 scale
Score × 100- Documentation revision
doc-71c2eb8031a81490↗- Author affiliations
- Apart Research; AI Safety Cape Town; Odyssean Institute; Heron AI Security; University of Chicago; Stanford University; Sentience Institute
Model configuration
Each result identifies a specific model version evaluated through its provider’s API with a specified reasoning setting. Configurations with different settings are published separately and are never averaged together.
The reference setting is the provider’s medium reasoning mode where available. If no medium mode exists, or the provider applies a different mode, the model label identifies the setting actually used and the model page records the qualification. A shared setting name does not imply an equivalent token budget or amount of computation across providers.
These are API evaluations. Application-level system prompts, tool access, routing and safeguards can change behaviour and are outside this configuration comparison.
Testing parameters
These conditions apply to every benchmark in every index.
- Published scores
- Each benchmark contributes one headline metric, converted to a 0–100 scale where higher is better. Values past either end are clipped.
- Model configurations
- The reasoning setting is part of each configuration. Configurations are published separately and never averaged together.
- Reasoning setting
- Each provider’s medium setting wherever one exists. Where a provider has none or runs another setting in its place, the model’s label names the setting that ran.
- Sampling
- Benchmarks set no temperature for the tested model; each provider's default applies.
- Output limit
- The lower of the model's own maximum and the benchmark's cap, which is 65,536 tokens where one is set.
- Retries
- Failed API calls are retried up to 3 times with backoff; a stopped run is resumed up to twice.
- Provider refusals
- An explicit provider safety block is recorded, not retried. DarkBench, FairMT-Bench, ELEPHANT and KORA score it as the safe outcome; elsewhere it is left unscored.
- Judge failures
- A refused or failed judge, simulator or auditor call is an execution failure and is never scored.
- Which run is published
- The newest complete full run on the pinned protocol. Partial runs never replace complete ones.
- Scope
- Scores describe API model configurations. Consumer apps may add their own prompts, tools and safeguards.
Coverage and uncertainty
Compare benchmark coverage as well as the aggregate score. When configurations have results for different subsets, their index scores summarize different evidence. A missing result is not evidence of safe or unsafe behaviour.
The displayed aggregate is a point estimate; it does not establish that a difference between configurations is statistically significant. Benchmark sample sizes, repeat counts, task dependence and judge variability affect interpretation. Consult the individual protocols before making claims from small score differences.
Scope exclusions
Coverage is limited to the behaviours sampled by the included benchmarks, predominantly in English text interactions. The index does not measure image or voice behaviour, real-world actions, general capability, utility, or the complete behaviour of a consumer application.
The published comparison uses the specified reasoning configuration. The effect of changing reasoning settings has not been quantified by this index, so results should not be generalized to other settings without additional evaluation.
Data access and citation
For reproducible comparisons, record the index name, model configuration identifiers, benchmark coverage, and the published_at and release_id fields from the score data. Distinguish native benchmark metrics from the published 0–100 scores used in the aggregate.
Cite the underlying benchmark papers and record the methodology revision used. For the overall index, also record the weight policy version. The JSON endpoint provides the current published score table; save the release used in an analysis alongside your results.
Published score data (JSON) ↗